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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to relate the quality of governance with crime in Malaysia. The
study also identifies the best good governance tool to fight against crime in Malaysia.
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses time-series data on crime rates and six
measures of governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. In this study the authors employed the
popular autoregressive distributed lagged modeling approach to estimate the long-run model of
crime and governance.
Findings – The authors test the hypothesis that good governance lowers crime rates (total crime,
violent and property crimes). The results suggest a negative relationship between crime rates and good
governance in Malaysia. This suggests that good governance reduces crime rates in Malaysia.
Research limitations/implications – The limitations of this study is the short time-series used in
the analysis which is from 1996 to 2009.
Practical implications – This study provides evidence that the practice of good governance,
for example, lower corruption, good policing and judicial system can mitigate crime in Malaysia.
Social implications – The implementation of good governance will protect property right of
individuals, business sector and the society as a whole, and this will enhance prosperity of a nation.
Originality/value – This study provide the first empirical evidence that linking between crime and
good governance in Malaysia.
Keywords Malaysia, Good governance, Crime, ARDL, Small sample
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether or not a long-run relationship exists
between good governance and crime rates in Malaysia. In the economic literature,
numerous studies suggest a positive relationship between poor government, and crime
rates. Poor government is generally defined in terms of government corruption and
poor enforcement laws for property rights. These studies also suggest that poor
government leads to a reduction in economic growth ( Jalilian et al., 2006; Pellegrini
and Gerlagh, 2004; Mauro, 1995; Aidt et al., 2008; Abe and Wilson, 2008; Blackburn and
Forgues-Puccio, 2009).
We add to the debate by investigating the long-run relationship between good
governance and crime rates in Malaysia. The World Bank (1994) defines governance
as the ability and capacity of a government to exercise its power to design, formulate
and implement policies, and with clear functions to manage a country’s resources for
economic and social development.
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Good governance of a country has also been defined in terms of accountability,
efficiency and effectiveness in public sector management, in terms of free flow of
information (i.e. transparency), and in terms of a clear legal framework for ensuring
social and economic development (i.e. justice, respect for human rights and liberties)
(United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2006).
The outcomes of poor quality governance are found to be related to increased
uncertainty, unpredictability and instability of a country’s political, economic and
social systems (North, 1990). Poor quality governance discourages domestic
and foreign investments, for example. It increases indirectly, the cost of trade
(i.e. transaction costs), thereby negatively affecting economic growth.
Sustained long-term economic growth, which would be the ultimate goal of any
government of any nation, cannot be achieved without a stable economic and political
system. To this end the protection of “property rights” is a crucial element (Mabry and
Ulbrich, 1989).
Property rights are defined in terms of the ownership of goods and services. They
provide a legal framework for the transfer and use of these goods and services. Without
property rights legislation criminal activities are encouraged, while the cost of “doing
legal and honest businesses,” for example, would escalate (Gradstein, 2003). Studies on
this topic suggest that without this type of government intervention the market would
not work effectively (Witte and Witt, 2001).
In this paper we investigate how effective the government can be in preventing
crime in Malaysia, where criminal activities are high. We postulate that crime
prevention, in terms of protecting property rights, and reduction in criminal activity,
are a signal of good governance.
We define crime in terms of crime rates. Crime rates are measured as the number of
reported crime per 100,000 people living in Malaysia. We distinguish crime between
property and violent crimes and provide the crime rates for those. Moreover, we
consider the period 1996-2009, as in Malaysia the data on crime are available only for
this time period. The 13 years period provides the basis for investigating the long-run
relationship between good governance and crime rates in Malaysia.
To provide a measure for this long-run relationship, we employ the autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) model suggested by Pesaran et al. (2001). The long-run
relationship can be inferred by the additional application of the method suggested by
Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002), Narayan (2005) and Turner (2006).
The paper is organized as follows. In second section, we review the empirical
literature related to crime and good governance. The method, data and model used in
the study are discussed in third section. In fourth section, we present and discuss the
empirical results. The last section is our conclusion.
Literature review
Recent studies have been investigating the role of governance in affecting economic
growth. The consensus is that if a positive relationship between economic growth and
good governance exists, there is a negative relationship between good governance
and crime (Neumayer, 2003; Andres and Asongu, 2013; Asongu and Oasis, 2013).
Asongu and Oasis (2013), for example, suggest a number of measures for good
governance and investigate what best mitigate the negative impact of crime on
economic growth across 38 African countries. For governance measures they include a
quality indicator of good laws and regulation, government effectiveness, political








































The cross-sectional data included control variables such as the number of policemen
employed, the number of working-age individuals, per capita gross domestic product
(GDP), and education and population density. The results suggest that quality of laws
and regulation, government effectiveness, political stability, voice and accountability,
corruption control and democracy, have significant impact on crime (and conflicts)
reduction. The results suggest that these aspects of good governance mitigate the
negative impact of crime on economic growth. Therefore, crime rates decrease with
increase in good governance.
Andres and Asongu (2013) provide another recent example of how good governance
can reduce crime. They investigate the government effort in combating software piracy
in 11 African countries. They provided similar governance measures as in the Asongu
and Oasis (2013) study, but with an additional variable: “press freedom quality.”
Using data from 2000 to 2010, with control variables such as population growth, real
GDP growth, gross domestic savings, foreign direct investments and government
investments, the findings confirmed that, except for press freedom quality, all other
governance indicators significantly decrease the incidence of software piracy.
In an earlier study, Neumayer (2003) investigated whether good political governance
and good economic policies reduce homicide rates in 117 countries. Measures of good
political governance included democracy, respect for human rights and the absence of
death penalty. Indicators for good economic policies comprised welfare expenditures,
economic discrimination of minorities and income inequality. The findings suggested that
the abolition of the death penalty, human rights and democracy lower homicide rates.
For the purpose of this study, we use six measures of governance as indicators of
quality governance (i.e. good or poor), as suggested by the World Bank (in Kaufman
et al., 2008). Some of these are common to the above mentioned studies. The indicators
are defined in the next section along with the method and model used in this study.
Data, methodology and model
For the purpose of this study, data on crime rates are extracted from the Yearbook of
Statistics published by the Department of Statistics Malaysia, for the years 1996-2009.
The data
All crime rates are measured as the number of reported crime per 100,000 people. We
distinguish crime between total crime (tct), violent crime (vct) and property crime ( pct).
As mentioned we employ six measures of governance. These are indicators of its
quality (as suggested by the World Bank – in Kaufman et al., 2008).
The measures are the following:
(1) voice and accountability: measures perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well
as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media;
(2) political stability and absence of violence: measures perceptions of the likelihood
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism;
(3) government effectiveness: measures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and






































(4) regulatory quality: measures perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and
promote private sector development;
(5) rule of law: measures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood
of crime and violence; and
(6) control of corruption: measures perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Table I provide full details of the sources and description of the variables used in this
study. All variables were transformed into natural logarithm before estimation.
The method and model
The investigation will proceeds as per the following. The specification of the model is
given first. However, before running the regression, a test for cointegration will be
performed to determine whether or not a long-run relationship between crime and
governance exists, and whether or not governance affects crime in the long-run.
Depending on the outcome of the test, and in the event of a cointegration (i.e.
governance affects crime in the long-run), an ARDL equation will be proposed and
estimated, to account for “spurious” regression results, which would otherwise lead to
“weak” results. To account for “spurious” regression results, we propose the
autoregressive distributed lag-restricted error-correction model (ARDL-RECM). The
results are presented and discussed in the following section.
The specification of the model for the long-run crime-governance in Malaysia is the
following:
crimet ¼ y0þy1governtþmt (1)
where small letters indicate variables in natural logarithm and μt is the error term.
The parameters θ ’s are to be estimated. It is a priori that we expect θ1o0, suggesting a
negative relationship between good governance and criminal activity, that is, increase
in government quality (good governance) will lead to reduction in crime rates.
However, estimating (1) using OLS is not a straight forward exercise because, as
mentioned, the estimated equation is subject to the so-called spurious regression results
No. Variables Sources
1 Total crime rate Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2012)
2 Violent crime rate Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2012)
3 Property crime rate Department of Statistics, Malaysia (2012)
4 Voice and accountability World Bank (2012)
5 Political stability World Bank (2012)
6 Government effectiveness World Bank (2012)
7 Regulatory quality World Bank (2012)
8 Rule of law World Bank (2012)
9 Control of corruption World Bank (2012)
Table I.









































(Granger and Newbold, 1974). Spurious regression results arise from estimating an
equation containing non-stationary economic variables. The results would lose validity.
However, recent research in time-series analysis found new procedures for better
estimating long-run and short-run relationships between non-stationary variables. The
following subsection explains the procedure adopted in this paper.
Testing for cointegration (long-run relationship)
One widely used procedure to account for spurious regression results was suggested
by Granger (1981, 1986). In a dynamic model specification, he employed an error-
correction mechanism (ECM) in single-equation and multi-equation macroeconomic
forecasting models, to test for cointegration. In our model, to do so, we employ the
bounds test proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001), which seems to be more appropriate,
given the time period considered. Furthermore, this approach does not impose the unit
root test requirement for the time-series variables.
We also argue that even though we investigate relationships for the time period
1996-2009, the estimators of the parameters can be consistent and can be tested for
cointegration. For example, Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that within the ARDL





ARDL-based estimators of the long-run coefficients are consistent, even in small
sample sizes. Moreover, Narayan (2005), for example, provided critical values for
samples as small as 30-80 observations, while Turner (2006), was able to generate
response surfaces for the F-test for cointegration, even in small samples.
To test for cointegration, or for the existence of a long-run relationship between
crime and governance, we propose to use the bounds test, as mentioned above.
First, we estimate the following ARDL unrestricted error-correction model (UECM),









where Δ is the difference operator, p and q are optimal lag length chosen; α0 is a
constant term and υ1t is the disturbance term in the crime equation. Then, we employ
the method suggested by Pesaran et al. (2001), to bound the test for cointegration, or for
the existence of a long-run relationship between crime and governance.
An F-test, which can be denoted as Fcrime(crime|govern) or Fcrime(.), for the joint
significance of the coefficients of the lag levels in (2) is proposed. The null hypothesis
for non-cointegration among variables in the equation, is the following: H0: β1¼ β2¼ 0,
against the alternative Ha: β1≠ β2≠ 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests
cointegration between crime and governance, or that governance affects crime in the
long-run.
The asymptotic distribution of critical values is obtained for cases in which all
regressors are purely I(1) as well as when the regressors are purely I(0) or mutually
cointegrated. It is calculated using the response surfaces as provided by Ericsson and
MacKinnon (2002), and as per Equation (4).
Because the critical value of the test depends on the order of integration of the






































exceeding the range are evidence of rejection, while values less than the range are
evidence of non-rejection, and finally, values within the range are inconclusive.
In other words, if the F-statistics exceed their respective upper critical values we can
conclude that a long-run relationship exists, without a need to know the order of
integration of the regressors. If the F-statistics fall below the lower critical values, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, and estimation can continue
assuming no long-run relationship. If the F-statistics falls between the two bounds, the
result is inconclusive.
In the event that crimet and governt are cointegrated after estimating (2), and
hence, in the event that governance affects crime in the long-run, the following









All the variables are defined in Table I. The optimal lag length in (3) is selected using
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) as suggested by Pesaran et al. (1996). In the








where ECMt is the error-correction term define as:









From (4), the significance of the parameter λ is indicative of cointegration. The
asymptotic critical values for the cointegration test, using the t-statistics on β1 and λ, is
calculated using the method by Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002), as mentioned above.
After the test, the long-run coefficients can be obtained from the estimates of (3)
ARDL-RECM, as follows:
crimet ¼ y0þy1governtþmt (6)
where y0 ¼ g0=1
Pp




i¼1 g1i; and where μt white noise. The
next section presents the results.
Empirical results
In this section, we present the results. Table II describes an interesting relationship
between crime rates and governance in Malaysia for 1996 and 2009. There are three
types of crime and six governance indicators (for its quality).
As mentioned, the three types of crime are total crime, violent crime and property
crime; whereas the indicators for the quality of governance are voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule
of law and control of corruption.
The data presented in Table II clearly suggest that the crime rates in Malaysia






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































crime reached 151.61 percent, violent crime reached 240.52 percent and property crime
reached 137.20 percent (see row 11, for example).
These trends indicate that for the 14 years period (see row 12, for example), and on
average, total crime has been increasing by 10.83 percent per year, while violent crime
and property crime have been increasing by 17.18 and 9.80 percent per year,
respectively. Interestingly, the 14 years period also suggest a worsening of the
indicators for good governance.
Only one good governance indicator (i.e. government effectiveness) has been
improving during the time period, from 0.75 in 1996 to 0.96 in 2009. However, the other
five indicators, such as voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality,
rule of law and control of corruption, have been worsening, suggesting “bad” governance.
These results indicate that crime rates in Malaysia increase with bad governance.
A scatter plot shows relationships of interest. For example, Figure 1 shows the
relationship between total crime and the six governance indicators. Figure 2 shows
the relationship between violent crime and the six governance indicators. Figure 3














































































In all the three cases, we can clearly observe the negative correlation between crime
rates and governance indicators (except for government effectiveness). Moving from
left to right (which means that we move from “bad” to “good” governance) on the
governance indicators’ scale, crime rates are lower. Thus, it seems clear that the better
the quality of governance, the lower the crime rates are.
However, the above scatter plots cannot indicate which of the six governance
indicators is most effective in decreasing crime in Malaysia. Moreover, we would not be
able to infer whether or not the relationships are significant, statistically. Let us
consider Table III.
In Table III (as well as in Tables IV and V) we only report the respective ARDL( p, q)
model (i.e. Equation (3)) for each of the governance indicators. For the long-run model
we only report the long-run coefficient, θ1 (Equations (1) or (6)) in row 13; for the
ARDL-RECM (Equation (4)) we report the coefficient of λ; and for the ARDL-UECM
(Equation (2)) we report both the coefficients of β1 in row 14, and the F-statistics for
H0: β1¼ β2¼ 0 in row 15. The final ARDL( p, q) models presented in Table III were
chosen based on the SBC and the non-serial correlation of the error terms.
In this study, we found that there is cointegration between the crime rate and
governance. We also found that when there is cointegration, the long-run equation is
non-spurious and therefore, the inference that a long-run relationship between crime
and governance exists, is valid.
The results from Table III suggest that the following: first, there is cointegration
between total crime rate and voice and accountability, political stability and control of
corruption.
Second, for model with voice and accountability, λ is statistically significant at the
10 percent level. Third, for political stability, λ is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level; β1 is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, while the F-statistic for the bounds
test is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Fourth, for the model with control of
corruption, λ is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, the practice of
good governance reduces total crime rates inMalaysia, and interestingly, it seems that the
control of corruption is the best government tool to mitigate total crime rates.
We also attempt to answer another question: which of the following crimes


























































This question would be in line with Cherry and List (2002, p. 81) who argue that “it is
inappropriate to pool crime types into a single decision model and that”, “much
of the existing empirical evidence suffers from aggregation bias.” We postulate that
criminals involved in these two different activities have different motives.
They respond differently to laws and regulations. We propose that, by identifying
which of the governance indicators criminals respond the most, we can also
identify which is the most appropriate governance tool that best mitigate these
two types of crime in Malaysia.
Table IV presents the results of the impact of good governance on violent crime. The
results suggest that good governance has no apparent impact on violent crimes.
The three tests for cointegration are not statistically significant at 1 or 5 or 10 percent
level, for all six governance indicators.
On the contrary, results in Table V suggest that all governance indicators, except
government effectiveness, can affectively decrease property crimes. The next section is
our conclusion.
Conclusion
In this study we investigated whether or not a long-run relationship exists between
good governance and crime rates in Malaysia. We considered three categories of crime
rates – total crime, violent and property crimes; and six measures of good governance







quality Rule of law
Control of
corruption
ARDL( p, q) ARDL(2, 0) ARDL(1, 0) ARDL(2, 0) ARDL(2, 0) ARDL(1, 2) ARDL(2, 1)
Constant 3.902 (3.727)** 4.335 (3.623)** 3.193 (2.334)** 4.556 (2.844)** 2.956 (1.965) 4.972 (3.755)**
tct−1 0.894 (4.316)** 0.348 (1.906) 0.948 (3.354)** 0.789 (2.845)** 0.531 (2.498)** 0.892 (4.042)**
tct−2 −0.511 (3.708)** −0.451 (2.295) −0.449 (2.721)** −0.635 (4.038)**
governt −0.220 (2.582)** −0.369 (3.201)** 0.124 (0.318) −0.559 (1.318) −0.724 (2.001) −0.183 (0.846)
governt−1 0.020 (0.053) −0.325 (1.420)
governt−2 0.980 (2.836)**
R2 0.772 0.669 0.587 0.656 0.723 0.794
SER 0.056 0.064 0.076 0.069 0.066 0.057
SBC 14.85 13.86 11.28 12.39 12.44 14.21
AR(1) p-value 0.983 0.304 0.796 0.949 0.304 0.239
Long-run
coefficient: θ1 −0.357 (2.500)** −0.567 (2.759)** 0.246 (0.321) −0.843 (1.575) 0.591 (0.447) −0.685 (2.962)**
H0: λ¼ 0,
t-statistic −0.617 (3.791)*** −0.651 (3.560)*** −0.503 (2.382) −0.663 (2.884) −0.468 (2.201) −0.743 (3.713)***
H0: β1¼ 0,
t-statistic −0.542 (3.011) −0.638 (4.552)** −0.533 (2.410) −0.663 (2.632) −0.468 (2.201) −0.743 (3.713)
H0: β1¼ β2¼ 0,
F-statistic 4.537 10.57** 2.913 3.676 4.107 7.389***
Notes: SBC, Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; SER, standard error of regression; AR(1), non-serial correlation of the first-order. For the
t-test for cointegration: for Kc(3), the critical values are −5.162 (1 percent), −3.902 (5 percent) and −3.356 (10 percent). For Kc(4), the
critical values are −5.633 (1 percent), −4.172 (5 percent) and −3.569 (10 percent). For Kc(5), the critical values are −6.170 (1 percent),
−4.479 (5 percent) and −3.779 (10 percent). For ARDL-RECM, the appropriate ARDL( p, q) for Kc(3) are ARDL(1, 0), and ARDL(1, 1); for
Kc(4) are ARDL(2, 0), ARDL(1, 2) and ARDL(2, 1). For ARDL-UECM, the appropriate ARDL( p, q) for Kc(4) are ARDL(1, 0), and ARDL
(1, 1); forKc(5) are ARDL(2, 0), ARDL(1, 2), and ARDL(2, 1). The t-values are calculated from the response surface given by Ericsson and
MacKinnon (2002). For the F-test for cointegration: for I(1) with k¼ 2, the critical values are 13.410 (1 percent), 7.924 (5 percent) and
5.940 (10 percent); for I(0) with k¼ 2, the critical values are 11.422 (1 percent), 6.561 (5 percent) and 4.898 (10 percent). The F-values are
calculated from the response surface given by Turner (2006). **,***Statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
Table III.










































accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law and control of corruption.
We utilized the ARDL model approach to test for cointegration, which is appropriate
for a small sample study. Our results suggest that good governance can reduce total
crime rates in Malaysia. However, when focussing on each crime, such as violent crime
and property crime, we found that the practice of good governance mostly affects
property crime rather than violent crime.
We found that while good governance decreases property crime, it cannot fight
violent crime. This distinction is important for the government to implement targeted
policies, and invest in appropriate tools, to fight crime.
The present study is limited in terms of a limited time period. Future studies could
be carried out first, by considering a longer period of time, up to 2013; and second, by
examining further the relationship between good governance and other categories of
crime rates, such as murder, attempted murder, gang robbery with firearms, gang
robbery without firearms, armed robbery, robbery without arms, rape, assault,
daylight burglary, night burglary, lorry-van theft, car theft, motorcycle theft, bicycle
theft and other theft.
Moreover, criminal activities could be further investigated by state.
There are 14 states in Malaysia. This implies that good governance could have a
critical effect on different types of crimes, as well as in different locations,










quality Rule of law
Control of
corruption
ARDL( p, q) ARDL(1, 1) ARDL(1, 0) ARDL(1, 0) ARDL(1, 0) ARDL(1, 0) ARDL(2, 1)
Constant −0.088 (0.089) 0.496 (0.520) 0.035 (0.039) 0.112 (0.117) 0.086 (0.045) 5.129 (2.968)**
vct−1 1.018 (4.303)** 0.910 (4.437)** 0.963 (4.811)** 0.986 (4.993)** 0.991 (2.936)** 0.804 (3.270)**
vct−2 −0.840 (2.779)**
governt −0.374 (2.605)** −0.195 (0.908) 0.256 (0.454) 0.005 (0.009) 0.017 (0.017) −1.014 (2.210)
governt−1 0.282 (1.532) −0.548 (1.634)
R2 0.873 0.759 0.743 0.737 0.737 0.897
SER 0.087 0.113 0.117 0.118 0.118 0.084
SBC 9.67 7.04 6.65 6.52 6.52 9.653
AR(1) p-value 0.140 0.467 0.701 0.615 0.562 0.523
Long-run
coefficient: θ1 5.121 (0.066) −2.191 (0.474) 7.015 (0.186) 0.429 (0.009) 1.998 (0.010) −1.508 (6.548)**
H0: λ¼ 0,
t-statistic 0.018 (0.076) −0.089 (0.434) −0.036 (0.182) −0.013 (0.067) −0.008 (0.026) −1.036 (2.901)
H0:β1¼ 0,
t-statistic −0.178 (0.719) −0.180 (1.003) −0.175 (0.674) −0.128 (0.778) −0.201 (0.656) −1.036 (2.901)
H0:β1¼ β2¼ 0,
F-statistic 0.294 0.745 0.320 0.758 0.923 4.968
Notes: SBC, Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; SER, standard error of regression; AR(1), non-serial correlation of the first-order. For the
t-test for cointegration: for Kc(3), the critical values are −5.162 (1 percent), −3.902 (5 percent) and −3.356 (10 percent). For Kc(4), the
critical values are −5.633 (1 percent), −4.172 (5 percent) and −3.569 (10 percent). For Kc(5), the critical values are −6.170 (1 percent),
−4.479 (5 percent) and −3.779 (10 percent). For ARDL-RECM, the appropriate ARDL( p, q) for Kc(3) are ARDL(1, 0), and ARDL(1, 1); for
Kc(4) are ARDL(2, 0), ARDL(1, 2) and ARDL(2, 1). For ARDL-UECM, the appropriate ARDL( p, q) for Kc(4) are ARDL(1, 0), and ARDL
(1, 1); forKc(5) are ARDL(2, 0), ARDL(1, 2), and ARDL(2, 1). The t-values are calculated from the response surface given by Ericsson and
MacKinnon (2002). For the F-test for cointegration: for I(1) with k¼ 2, the critical values are 13.410 (1 percent), 7.924 (5 percent) and
5.940 (10 percent); for I(0) with k¼ 2, the critical values are 11.422 (1 percent), 6.561 (5 percent) and 4.898 (10 percent). The F-values are
calculated from the response surface given by Turner (2006). **,***Statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
Table IV.
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H0: β1¼ β2¼ 0,
F-statistic 7.857*** 4.588 4.651 5.751 7.476*** 7.854***
Notes: SBC, Schwarz Bayesian Criterion; SER, standard error of regression; AR(1), non-serial correlation of the first-order; For the
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(1, 1); forKc(5) are ARDL(2, 0), ARDL(1, 2), and ARDL(2, 1). The t-values are calculated from the response surface given by Ericsson and
MacKinnon (2002). For the F-test for cointegration: for I(1) with k¼ 2, the critical values are 13.410 (1 percent), 7.924 (5 percent) and
5.940 (10 percent); for I(0) with k¼ 2, the critical values are 11.422 (1 percent), 6.561 (5 percent) and 4.898 (10 percent). The F-values are
calculated from the response surface given by Turner (2006). **,***Statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively
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